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REVERSING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON
PIPELINE: INITIAL FINDINGS FROM THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ON THE EFFICACY OF
TRAINING AND MOBILIZING COURT-APPOINTED
LAWYERS TO USE SPECIAL EDUCATION
ADVOCACY ON BEHALF OF AT-RISK YOUTH
Joseph B. Tulman and Kylie A. Schofield*
INTRODUCTION

This article will describe the implementation and analyze the
results of an attorney training and mobilizing project of the Juvenile
and Special Education Law Clinic (Clinic) 1of the University of the2
District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law (UDC-DCSL).
* Joseph B. Tulman, J.D., M.A.T., is a professor of law at the
University of the
District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law (UDC-DCSL); Kylie A.
Schofield, J.D., is a lawyer in California who graduated from UDC-DCSL in 2011
and who was a student in the Juvenile and Special Education Law Clinic. The
authors thank, for their research assistance and for their comments on drafts of this
article, the following people: Sharon Dennis, a lawyer who audited the Clinic in fall
2011 and who is now the executive director of Eyes Wide Open Mentoring (serving
children who are homeless); Rachel Lawrence, a 2012 UDC-DCSL graduate who
was also in the Clinic; and Seth E. Packrone, M.Phil., J.D., an expert in inclusive and
special education.
I In 2010, the University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School
of Law, with financial support from Crowell & Moring LLP, established the Took
Crowell Institute for Youth. The Juvenile and Special Education Law Clinic is now a
part of the Took Crowell Institute.
2 UDC-DCSL is D.C.'s only public law school. From the late 1980s until 1996,
the law school was an independent agency of D.C., operated as the District of
Columbia School of Law. It merged into the University of the District of Columbia
in 1996. The mission of the School of Law-inherited from its predecessor
institution, the pioneering, progressive Antioch School of Law-is to represent, to
the greatest extent feasible, low-income people, particularly low-income D.C.
residents, and to educate people from traditionally under-represented groups.

This project was premised in part on the notion that many of the
children caught in the District of Columbia's school-to-prison pipeline
have disabilities that significantly affect their ability to learn, and that
many of these children therefore encounter, more than other children,
conflict with school personnel and failure in school. These children
disproportionately repeat grades, face school exclusion (suspension
and expulsion), and leave school without graduating.
Clinic faculty members posited that the underlying problem in
many delinquency cases is, at least to a significant degree, a failure of
school administrators to comply with the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act 4 (IDEA) by failing to provide appropriate special
education services to at-risk youth who are eligible for, and entitled to,
those services. Indeed, one of Congress's primary purposes in passing
the federal special education law was to end the practice by school
administrators of excluding-often based upon 5charges of
misbehavior-children with education-related disabilities.
The IDEA represents the centerpiece of a legal revolution that has
greatly improved the education available to students with disabilities.
At the most basic level, IDEA and its predecessor, the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), 6 increased access to
education for students with disabilities. Prior to the passage of
EAHCA in 1975, approximately fifty percent of America's four
million children with disabilities did not enjoy the benefits of a public
education. 7 By 2002, almost six million students with disabilities were
Katherine S. Broderick, The Nation's Urban Land-Grant Law School: Ensuring
Justice in the 21 Century, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 305-06 (2009) (citing D.C. CODE §
38-1202.06(2)(C)(ii)-(iii) (2001)).
3 Cf generally COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS JUSTICE CTR. & TEX. A&M U. PUB.
POL'Y RES. INST., BREAKING SCHOOLS' RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF How
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE RELATES

TO

STUDENTS'

SUCCESS AND JUVENILE

JUSTICE

INVOLVEMENT xi-xii (2011) (in a longitudinal study of nearly one million Texas
students, those suspended and/or expelled were found to be more likely to repeat a
grade, drop out, or be involved in the delinquency system).
4 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.
(2006).

5 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 596-97 (1988). See generally Joseph B. Tulman

& Douglas M. Weck, Shutting Off the School-to-Prison Pipelinefor Status Offenders
with Education-RelatedDisabilities,54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 875 (2010) [hereinafter
Tulman & Weck].
6 Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 1, 89
Stat. 773 (1975).
7 Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield, Introduction, in RACIAL INEQUALITY IN
SPECIAL EDUCATION xv (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., Harvard Educ. Press
2002.

enrolled in public schools. 8 IDEA has done more than just increase
access for students with disabilities; it has produced tangible
educational benefits for them, as well. Not only have graduation rates
for students with disabilities increased dramatically, but also the
number of these graduating students who attend college has nearly
tripled since 1978. 9
Improvements in the special education system, however, have not
benefitted all students equally. While students with disabilities from
middle and upper-income households have enjoyed educational gains,
the outcomes for low-income students with disabilities remain
stagnant. 10 This implementation gap persists between, on the one hand,
the requirements of federal special education law and, on the other
hand, school-level practices. The IDEA remains largely unenforced for
many students from low-income families. Clinic faculty resolved to
address, and to attempt to close, this implementation gap for courtinvolved youth with disabilities.
Believing that enforcement of the IDEA on behalf of this cohort of
children could substantially increase school success and,
correspondingly, dramatically reduce juvenile incarceration, 11 Clinic
faculty launched a program to train and to mobilize lawyers in the
District of Columbia who were already representing children in
delinquency matters and representing children and parents in child
abuse and neglect matters. Accordingly, as described in this article,
Clinic faculty trained-in addition to law students in the Clinic-a
large number of court-appointed lawyers to provide skilled and
assertive legal representation in special education matters. 12
The attorney training and mobilizing project began in the early
1990s. This article will document and examine the resulting explosion
of successful special education litigation on behalf of this population
of at-risk children in the District of Columbia, while also considering
the large decline in the rate of juvenile incarceration during this same
Id.
9 Id.

Thomas Hehir, Looking Forward: Toward a New Role in Promoting
Education Equity for Students with Disabilitiesfrom Low-Income Backgrounds, in
HANDBOOK OF EDUCATION POLICY RESEARCH 832 (David Plank, Barbara Schneider
& Gary Sykes eds., Rutledge Press 2009).
11 Unless otherwise noted, the word "incarceration," when used in this article,
means both short-term secure placement (e.g., pre-trial and pre-disposition detention)
and long-term secure placement.
12 See infra Part II.A. During an initial five-year period in the early to mid1990s, Clinic faculty trained approximately 100 court-appointed attorneys.
10

period of time. The central inquiry, therefore, is whether enforcing
special education rights contributed to the large decline of juvenile
incarceration in D.C. between 1993 and 2009.
In order to contextualize and to sharpen this central inquiry, this
article will also review additional developments in the nature of
education and juvenile justice reform in the District over the past two
and a half decades. These additional developments include a juvenile
justice class action lawsuit (JerryM.) that challenged the conditions at
D.C.'s three juvenile incarceration facilities; a special education class
action lawsuit (Blackman-Jones) that challenged the failure to provide
timely special education hearings and the failure of the local education
agency to comply with settlement agreements and hearing officer
determinations in thousands of individual special education cases; a
symposium on unnecessary detention in D.C.; the closing, since 1993,
of three relatively large delinquency incarceration facilities, along with
the opening of two relatively small facilities; and the creation of a blue
ribbon commission on juvenile justice reform.
This article contends that these additional developments are related
to the decline of incarceration of D.C. youth during this same period.
While recognizing that significant systemic change does not occur in a
vacuum, this article will also suggest that the special education
training and mobilizing effort and the dramatic and unprecedented rise
in special education advocacy for at-risk children contributed
significantly to the declining numbers of youth incarcerated in the
District of Columbia during this period. Finally, this article invites
advocates in other jurisdictions to scrutinize this analysis and to
consider implementing an approach similar to the attorney special
education training and mobilizing effort in D.C. 13

13

Clinic faculty did not conduct or commission

a contemporaneous

quantitative study over the past two or two and a half decades, and the authors of this
article have not identified data sources that adequately illuminate rates of arrest,
probation, and other variables over the past twenty to twenty-five years.
Accordingly, this article reports only the decline of the juvenile incarceration
capacity between 1993 and 2009 in the District of Columbia. The authors hope that
the substantial correlation between the rise of special education advocacy and the
decline of juvenile incarceration will provoke interest and action, as well as moving
others to work to close the implementation gap between the IDEA and school-based
practices and to find methods for measuring the impact of enforcing the special
education law on a large scale on behalf of children in the school-to-prison pipeline.

I.

BACKGROUND: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
AND THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE

The United States is in the midst of a multi-decade explosion of
incarceration rates. 14 The number of people in local, state, and federal

incarceration facilities has risen dramatically since 1970.15 Both as a
percentage of the population and in terms of actual numbers, the U.S.
is the most-incarcerated country in the world, with a rate of
16
incarceration that is four times the average rate of other countries.
The U.S. youth incarceration rate is the highest, by far, of any

developed nation.

17

The over-reliance on incarceration has been

counterproductive not just in terms of dollars wasted, but also, more

significantly, in terms of lives derailed. 8
This unparalleled increase in incarceration is not colorblind.
Rather, it is primarily a function of a radical rise in the incarceration

rates of black and brown people, principally low-income AfricanAmerican males. 19 Although three-fifths of the youth population in

America is white, approximately three-fifths of incarcerated youth are
African American or Latino. 20 The population of incarcerated children
in the District of Columbia is-and has been for decades-virtually

100 percent children of color from low-income families.21
14 DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON'T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND
THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA 146-47 (2011).
15

Id. at 147 (calculating the increase in incarceration as an 1100% increase);

cf, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representationfor the Poor: Can Society Afford
this Much Injustice?, 75 Mo. L. REV. 683 (2010) (calculating rise from
approximately 200,000 to 2.3 million incarcerated persons as an 800% increase).
16 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME &
DELINQUENCY, US RATES OF INCARCERATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 1-3 (Nov.

2006),
available
http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication-pdf/factsheet-usincarceration.pdf.

at

17 RICHARD A. MENDAL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., No PLACE FOR KIDS: THE
CASE

FOR

REDUCING

JUVENILE

INCARCERATION

2

(2011),

available at

http://www.aecf.org/OurWork/JuvenileJustice/JuvenileJusticeReport.aspx.
The
juvenile incarceration rate in the United States in 2002 was 336 per 100,000
juveniles, nearly five times higher than the rate in the next-highest country. Id.
is See id. at 3.
19 See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 1115 (2011); see generally Michelle Alexander, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
20 MENDAL, supra note 17, at 2.

21 Cf., e.g,. Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Race and National Origin as Influential
Factors in Juvenile Detention, 3 D.C. L. REV. 355, 370 tbl.1 (1995) (showing that the

Court-appointed attorneys ostensibly responsible for defending
low-income children often have unmanageable caseloads, and, as a
result, do not provide their delinquency clients with adequate
representation. 22 Many-perhaps the vast majority of those childrenare children with education-related disabilities who are not receiving
appropriate services in public schools. 23 Exacerbating the problem,
state and federal legislatures have promoted "zero tolerance" policies,
and local education officials increasingly have ceded school
disciplinary matters to police officers. 24 Moreover, during the 1990s,
virtually every state amended its delinquency and criminal statutes to

push more children into adult criminal courts and, consequently, into
adult jails and prisons. 25 America's swelling school-to-prison pipeline
is draining inner cities and flushing children and young adults into
mostly rural incarceration institutions. 26
percentage of the population of incarcerated children in D.C. that are minority is 100
percent); see also Hearing for the Review of Deficiencies at the District of
Columbia's Youth Services Administration Hearing, U.S. Senate Comm. on
Appropriations, Dist. of Columbia Subcomm. (Mar. 30, 2004) (testimony of Eugene
N. Hamilton, Senior Judge (and former Chief Judge) of the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia and Chair of the Mayor's Blue Ribbon Commission on Youth
Safety
and
Juvenile
Justice
Reform),
available
at
http://www.dcwatch.com/govern/dhs040330.htm [hereinafter Testimony of Judge
Hamilton], ("[L]et me underscore another critical finding from the Commission: one
hundred percent of the committed youth in the District's delinquency system are
African-American and Latino youth. White children and youth are arrested for a
range of delinquent offenses, but they do not end up at Oak Hill.").
22 Cf generally, e.g., Bright, supra note 15, at 684-85 (across the country,
public defenders for low-income defendants have unmanageable caseloads and are
therefore unable to provide high-quality representation).
23 See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., KIDS COUNT ESSAY: A ROAD
MAP FOR
JUVENILE
JUSTICE
REFORM
(2008),
available
at
http://www.aecf.org/-/media/Pubs/Initiatives/KIDS%20COUNT/123/2008KidsCoun
tEssayARoadmapforJuvenileJusticeReform!KC08EssayRoadMap.pdf;
see
generally Tulman & Weck, supra note 5, at 876.
24

ADVANCEMENT

PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH

AND PUSH

OUT: How "ZERO

TOLERANCE" AND HIGH STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TO-

PRISON PIPELINE 9 (Mar. 2010) (revised). JUSTICE POLICY INST. EDUCATION UNDER
ARREST: THE CASE AGAINST POLICE IN SCHOOLS 1, 13-16 (Nov. 2011), availableat

http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/educationunderarrestfullreport.pdf.
25 See, e.g., OJJDP National Report Series Bulletin, Juveniles in Court 4 (June
2003) ("From 1992 through 1999, 49 states and the District of Columbia enacted or
expanded
their
transfer
provisions"),
available
at
https ://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/195420/page4.html.
26 In July of 2011, the Attorney General of the United States and the Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Education announced a joint project, the Supportive

In 1975, Congress found that students with disabilities were "either
totally excluded from schools or sitting idly in regular classrooms
awaiting the time when they were old enough to drop out.' 27 As a
result, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children
ActZ8-which has since been amended and renamed the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 2 9 -to address the unmet
educational needs of millions of children with disabilities.30 The IDEA
requires public schools to provide such students with a free and
appropriate public education (FAPE). 31
In some circumstances, a child's acting out in school may indicate
that the child has an education-related disability and should be
receiving special education services. 32 Under the IDEA's "child find"
duty, school personnel have an affirmative obligation to identify
children whom they suspect have education-related disabilities. 33 A
parent has a parallel right to obtain from the school system, without
charge to the parent, evaluations of the child in any area of suspected
34
disability. When school administrators fail to identify and to serve
children with disabilities appropriately or, even worse, actively
School Discipline Initiative, aimed at "address[ing] the 'school-to-prison pipeline'
and the disciplinary policies and practices that can push students out of school and
into the justice system. . . . Ensuring that our educational system is a doorway to
opportunity-and not a point of entry to our criminal justice system-is a critical,
and achievable, goal,' said Attorney General [Eric] Holder." Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General Holder, Secretary Duncan
Announce Effort to Respond to School-to-Prison Pipeline by Supporting Good
Discipline Practices (July 21, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/July/11-ag951 .html.
27 Ronald K. Lospennato, Multifaceted Strategies to STOP the School-toPrisonPipeline,42 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 528 n.4 (2009).
28 Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 1, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
29 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (2006).
30 See id. § 1400(c)(2).
31 Id. §§ 1400 (d)(1)(A), 1401(9) ("The purposes of this chapter are . ..to
ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free, appropriate
public education (FAPE) that emphasizes special education and related services
designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education,
employment, and independent living."). 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A), 1401(9); see
also id. at §§ 1400(d)(1)(B)-(C), 1400(d)(2)-(4).
32 SUSAN BURRELL & LOREN WARBOYS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL
EDUCATION IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (July 2000), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles 1/ojjdp/179359.pdf.
33 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a)(1) (2006).
34 See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)-(c) (2006); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.300300.311 (2006); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B) (2006); 34 C.F.R. §
300.304(c)(4) (2006).

exclude children with disabilities, they are often, in effect, pushing
those children into the school-to-prison pipeline.35 The remedy is
systemic reform aimed at enforcing the special education law; keeping
children with disabilities in school; and returning children with
disabilities from delinquency incarceration to school.36
II.

THE SPECIAL EDUCATION TRAINING AND MOBILIZING EFFORT
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

A. Objectives of the Training and Mobilizing Effort
Faculty members in the UDC-DCSL Clinic designed and initiated,

beginning in the early 1990s, an experimental effort aimed at reversing
the school-to-prison pipeline in D.C. 37 Recognizing that children with
disabilities are overrepresented in the delinquency system, 38 the
"The school -to -prison pipeline is the product of the policies of school
districts, law enforcement agencies, and courts that criminalize in-school behavior or
otherwise push disadvantaged, underserved, and at-risk children from mainstream
educational environments into the juvenile justice system, and all too often [into] the
criminal justice system." Lospennato, supra note 27, at 529; ANNIE E. CASEY
FOUND., supra note 23 ("A disproportionate share of public school students referred
to the juvenile justice system under zero-tolerance policies are youth with
educational disabilities, suggesting that schools are opting to prosecute rather than
educate students with special needs.").
36 "Changing what happens in our public schools is critical in that,
absent
system reform, children and youths continue to be pushed into the [juvenile
delinquency and criminal] systems. Without education reform, students caught up in
the juvenile system are much less likely to obtain the services and skills that prevent
them from being funneled into the pipeline again and into the adult correctional
system." Lospennato, supra note 27, at 531.
37 At the Antioch School of Law, the Juvenile Law Clinic focused primarily on
defending children in delinquency cases and secondarily on representing children in
child welfare (i.e., child abuse and neglect) cases. In the mid-1980s, a clinician in the
Juvenile Law Clinic who supervised law students working on neglect cases left the
Juvenile Law Clinic to start a separate clinic that focused exclusively on special
education representation. In the early 1990s, supervisors in the D.C. School of Law's
Juvenile Law Clinic incorporated special education advocacy into the Clinic's
curriculum and changed the name of the Clinic to the Juvenile and Special Education
Law Clinic.
38 Studies show that seventy percent of incarcerated youths have some kind of
disability, and that twenty percent of students with emotional disabilities are arrested
before they leave school. BURRELL & WARBOYS, supra note 32, at 1. In the mid1990s, staff at the District of Columbia's Oak Hill Youth Center suggested that every
child was testing between two and five years below grade level. Bart Lubow &
Joseph B. Tulman, The Unnecessary Detention of Children in the District of
35

faculty members' central legal strategy in this advocacy effort was to
assert the special education rights of low-income, minority children
who are ensnared in the D.C. delinquency system. 39 The idea was ' to
"transform delinquency defendants into special education plaintiffs. 40
Thus, the principal objective of the effort was to serve delinquency
clients more effectively by asserting their special education rights,
addressing their educational and emotional needs (and perhaps some
of the underlying causes of the delinquency involvement), and,
41
whenever possible, extricating them from the delinquency system.
When ending the delinquency prosecution was not an obtainable
outcome, advocates used special education rights and services in an
effort to ensure that the child was not preventively detained or
incarcerated following disposition.
Here is a summary of the strategy:
For the majority of the clients, appropriate special
education services could constitute-as a matter of
delinquency law-sufficient care and rehabilitation
or, for detained children, sufficient preventative
services to justify release from incarceration. For
clients with records of adjudications for violent
offenses for whom release from secure placement is
not likely immediately, the clinicians expect to
demonstrate that education and treatment personnel at
Columbia, 3 D.C. L. REV. 2, 5 (1995); see also Mary G. Hines, Children with
Disabilitiesin Detention: Legal Strategies to Secure Release, 3 D.C. L. REV. 299,
300 (1995). The state education agency of the District of Columbia recently reported
that students with disabilities are much more likely than their non-disabled peers to

face disciplinary charges. See

OFFICE OF THE STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUC.
(OSSE), REDUCING OUT-OF-SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS IN DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
PUBLIC
AND
PUBLIC
CHARTER
SCHOOLS
4-5
(2013),

http://osse.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/osse/publication/attachments/OSSE-RE
PORT DISCIPLINARY G PAGES.pdf.
39 The delinquency system in the District of Columbia is populated almost
exclusively by children of color from low-income families. See supra note 21.
40 Joseph B. Tulman, The Best Defense is a Good Offense:
Incorporating
Special Education Law into Delinquency Representation in the Juvenile Law Clinic,
42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 223, 225 (1992).
41 Id. at 224. The second objective of the project was to train law students to
work in a more proactive manner, integrating delinquency defense and special
education advocacy, in order more effectively to help clients accomplish their
objectives and priorities. Id. at 224-25.

the juvenile prison are not providing, and are not able
to provide, appropriate special education services.
Federal law requires states to provide appropriate
special education and related services to children with
disabilities; therefore, the clinicians anticipate that
special education advocacy for those clients with
violent records will lead to changing their placements
to placements that can provide appropriate services
• . . [and] so release to home or to a better treatment
environment will be a likely result in a typical case.42
Another critical objective of the effort was to raise the standard of
practice among public defenders and court-appointed defense
attorneys representing children in delinquency proceedings. In addition
to training law students, the program sought to train lawyers who
regularly represented children in delinquency matters to use special
education law proactively for their clients. To accomplish this
objective, the Clinic faculty presented a series of training sessions for
lawyers. In addition, the Clinic faculty established a network of
private, special education legal experts who were willing to accept
referrals from attorneys representing children in delinquency cases.
Over a five-year period, from 1992 to 1997, the Clinic faculty
conducted training sessions approximately
two times per year and
43
trained approximately 100 lawyers.
The overall organizing objective was to change the system through
a case aggregation strategy. This strategy was first described by Gary
Bellow in his critique of the federal legal services program, Turning
42 SPECIAL EDUCATION ADVOCACY UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES

ACT FOR CHILDREN IN THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY SYSTEM 3.4-3.5 (Joseph B.

Tulman & Joyce A. McGee eds., 1998), available at https://udc.siteym.com/resource/resmgr/facultydocs/tulman-special ed manual.pdf
[hereinafter
Tulman & McGee].
43 At local conferences and training sessions, Clinic faculty also conducted
short workshops on the use of special education advocacy for delinquency and
neglect clients. The earliest, in 1984, was a workshop by Professor Tulman for courtappointed attorneys, sponsored by the D.C. Public Defender Service, entitled
Diversion and Dismissal [of Delinquency Cases] Using the Special Education
System. In 1989, Professor Tulman conducted a workshop at the D.C. Bar Annual
Convention titled Special Education, Child Neglect, and Juvenile Delinquency. In
addition, at the annual D.C. Neglect-Delinquency Practice Institute and at the annual
Criminal Practice Institute in D.C., Clinic faculty members periodically conducted
sessions highlighting the use of special education advocacy for clients in delinquency
and neglect cases.

Solutions into Problems. The Legal Aid Experience. 44 In that
influential article, Bellow described how the routine provision of legal
aid services was, in effect, perpetuating the very injustices the program
was originally designed to correct. Bellow ascribed this phenomenon
in part to the "cautious, detached, client-controlling manner" in which
legal aid lawyers performed their work, and the inexorable pressure to
settle cases for something far short of the best result when handling, as
most legal aid lawyers do, a heavy caseload.4 5 Bellow contrasted the
routine approach to representing legal aid clients with a more robust,
overtly political model in which legal aid attorneys could represent
individual clients with an eye towards the larger social context from
which the individual cases arise. Note that this more political model
could also be "client-controlling." Moreover, Bellow posited that even
the most junior-level legal aid lawyers could accomplish tremendous
social change, not by bringing large and risky "test" cases, but by
simply enforcing existing rights already guaranteed by law, but
ignored in practice.
There is an enormous gap between existing laws and
the practices of most public and private institutions.
The country's willingness to enact new rules to quell
demands for change, followed by their nullification
by bureaucratic nullification or non-enforcement, has
created a situation in which there is hardly an aspect
of economic and political life today which would not
be significantly altered if behavior was made to
conform to officially promulgated norms and
regulations. Such compliance becomes a reality when
claims ("rights") authorized by existing laws and
procedures are aggressively asserted by lawyers
subsidized by government funds against litigants who
must pay their attorneys in the process. Adversaries in
such a position often find that accepting a sought-for
reform is preferable to resisting it in a large number
46
of cases .

44 Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience,
34
NLADA
BRIEFCASE
106
(1977),
available
at
http://www.garybellow.org/garywords/solutions.html.
41 Id. at 3.
46 Id. at 14.

Clinic faculty enlisted court-appointed delinquency defense
attorneys and child welfare attorneys to join in implementing a case
aggregation strategy that sought to enforce the previously unenforced
special education rights of at-risk D.C. youth who were in the schoolto-prison pipeline.
B. A Description of the Training and Mobilizing Effort
Between 1990 and 1995, Clinic faculty conducted biannual special
education law and practice trainings for court-appointed delinquency
and neglect attorneys. Each training was designed to be sufficiently
long and detailed so that a participating lawyer who completed the
training would be prepared to begin providing special education
representation to parents of children who were either in the
delinquency or the neglect system. The trainings were at least nine
hours long and typically ran for twelve or more hours. 47 The Clinic
faculty provided each participant with a large notebook that contained
the federal statute (the IDEA) and federal regulations, as well as the
D.C. special education and disciplinary regulations. The notebooks
also contained the most significant U.S. Supreme Court, D.C. Circuit,
and D.C. District Court cases, along with resource lists (e.g., a list of
private special education schools), substantive outlines48 and charts, and
simulation exercises used during the training sessions.
Almost all of the 100 lawyers trained through this program
between 1990 and 1995 were representing children as court-appointed
counsel in delinquency cases or representing parents and children as
court-appointed counsel in neglect cases. Perhaps half of those
attorneys incorporated special education advocacy into their practice
and began to provide special education representation to some of their
delinquency and neglect clients.
After the initial five-year period, the Clinic faculty continued to
provide special education training for court-appointed attorneys. For
example, the faculty designed and implemented a program called the
Although the schedules varied, a typical schedule-designed to avoid
conflicts with the attorneys' court schedules-started with a long Saturday session,
followed by three evenings of two or three hours during the week, and another long
Saturday session.
48 Tulman & McGee, supra note 42, at 3.3. In 1998, with financial support
from the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the Clinic faculty published a comprehensive
manual on using special education advocacy on behalf of delinquency clients. At the
inaugural National Juvenile Defender Summit in Chicago in 1998, juvenile public
defenders from all fifty states received copies of the publication.
47

Semester-in-Residence Program. 49 This program targeted courtappointed neglect attorneys exclusively. The faculty solicited
applications and accepted seven attorneys, all of whom were
representing parents and children in neglect cases.50 As a condition of
acceptance into the program, the participating attorneys had to agree to
attend the clinical classes over the course of the semester and to bring
into the Clinic two neglect cases in which special education advocacy
and legal representation likely could advance the clients' objectives.
Further, each of the participating attorneys was required to join with a
team of two law students for the purpose of jointly representing the
attorney's clients in seeking to enforce special education rights. As
part of the team, the attorney also participated in weekly tutorials with
the two5 1law students and with the supervising clinical faculty
member.
All of the seven attorneys substantially redirected and transformed
their law practices, making special education representation either a
primary or a major focus. At least five of the seven attorneys
concentrated their practices on special education advocacy on behalf
of parents and children who also had neglect cases in the Superior
Court.5 2 In the years since the Semester-in-Residence Program, Clinic
faculty members frequently have allowed attorneys who are interested
in learning special education law to audit the classroom component of
the clinical course.53
49 During this period, outside attorneys participated in the clinic along with law
students in four out of eight semesters. Id.
50 Through the initial five-year attorney training effort, the primary target
audience was court-appointed delinquency attorneys, but neglect attorneys also
participated. In addition to teaching special education law and practice, the clinic
faculty focused on presenting strategies for using special education advocacy on
behalf of delinquency clients and, to a lesser degree, neglect clients. Also, clinic
faculty accepted virtually any court-appointed attorney who applied into the biannual
special education training sessions. The Semester-in-Residence Program was an
attempt to focus exclusively on neglect attorneys. In addition, the Semester-inResidence Program selection process was exclusive in the sense that only seven
attorneys were admitted.
51 These weekly sessions were essentially for discussing the clients' casestalking through legal issues and strategic considerations and ensuring that the work
assignments were divided among the team members and that each team member was
managing his or her responsibilities.
52 Three of the attorneys who participated in the Semester-in-Residence
Program subsequently became magistrate judges or associate judges in the Superior
Court.
53 The classroom component of the Juvenile and Special Education Law Clinic
is focused primarily on special education law and practice. Because some of the

In 1994 and again in 1999, Clinic faculty conducted training
sessions for the judges at the Superior Court. 54 The trainings contained
an overview of special education substantive and procedural rights,
along with an introduction to the significance of education-related
disabilities and special education advocacy to the issues in
delinquency and neglect cases.
C. Expanding the Training Effort and the Number of Special
EducationAttorneys
In the summer of 1995, based on an invitation from the head of
D.C.'s delinquency agency, Clinic faculty conducted a three-day
training session for staff members at Oak Hill Youth Center (Oak
Hill). The forty staff members who attended included some teachers
and administrators from the facility's educational program, some
members of the mental health staff, and a small number of the
correctional staff. As part of the training, the Clinic faculty members
explicitly asserted that many of the incarcerated youth had unmet and,
in many instances, unidentified special education needs. Further,
Clinic faculty posited that many of the youth were incarcerated in
large part because of their failure and frustration in school and their
related perception that they needed to develop competence and
economic options "on the street." Part of the message was that
providing appropriate special education and related services is both a
preventative approach and a means for getting and keeping children
out of incarceration. In discussions with the three Clinic faculty
members, many of the facility staff members essentially agreed with
these observations about the unmet educational and special education
needs of the incarcerated youth. Some of the staff members said that

classes focus on basic lawyering skills (like interviewing and counseling), the Clinic
faculty ordinarily discuss with auditing attorneys which classes, if any, are not
necessary for the attorneys to attend. Auditing attorneys are required to read assigned
materials and otherwise prepare for class. During the spring 2012 semester, the
classroom component of the Clinic was in the evening, and seven attorneys audited
the class. In the summer of 2014, the classroom component was again in the evening,
and another seven attorneys-mostly criminal defense attorneys-audited the class.
54 The Superior Court of the District of Columbia is a court of general
jurisdiction with a Family Division (now the Family Court) responsible for, among
other things, delinquency and neglect cases. The Superior Court currently has sixtyone associate judges and twenty-four magistrate judges. Funding for D.C.'s Superior
Court comes from the federal government, and associate judges on the court are
appointed by the president of the United States for renewable, fifteen-year terms.

the juvenile facility was a repository for the failures of other agencies
that were supposed to be serving young people. Signaling a subtle but
significant race and class affinity with the youth, some staff members
expressed their view that the juvenile prison was a dumping ground for
throwaway children.
At around the same time, the head of the delinquency agency also
invited the Clinic faculty members to attend an event at the juvenile
prison and to make a presentation to the parents of incarcerated youth
about special education rights. This presentation to the parents resulted
in Clinic faculty and law students representing a handful of these
parents regarding the special education needs of their incarcerated
children. Clinic faculty and law students experienced a remarkable
level of cooperation with teachers, mental health workers, and other
staff during a series of individualized education program (IEP)
meetings at the juvenile incarceration facility following the training of
Oak Hill staff and the presentation to the parents. Facility staff worked
with the parents, children, and special education advocates and openly
discussed what set of educational, transition, and other related services
would facilitate a young person's leaving 55the institution and returning
to the community safely and productively.
Two attorneys from the District of Columbia's Public Defender
Service (PDS) attended the three-day training at Oak Hill. These two
56
attorneys were working in PDS's Juvenile Services Program (JSP).
The PDS JSP attorneys found that "[t]he expertise developed by the
JSP attorneys in special education law directly impacted the attorneys'
success in numerous post-commitment litigation proceedings and
pretrial placement motions focused on alternatives to detention.' 57 For
55 At the time, the local education agency for D.C. was not administering the
educational program at the juvenile incarceration facility. This independence may
have contributed to the willingness of institutional staff to develop IEPs, for students
who were leaving the institution, that prescribed small student-teacher ratios and
sufficient related services and supports.
56 Working out of their offices at the juvenile detention center and the juvenile
long-term incarceration facility, PDS JSP attorneys, along with the law school
interns whom they supervise, provide a range of services to detained and
incarcerated children. The attorneys and interns defend incarcerated children who
face additional sanctions for allegedly violating institutional rules. The PDS JSP
attorneys and interns also help the incarcerated children challenge substandard
conditions of confinement and assist the children's defense attorneys in advocating
for temporary or permanent release. In addition, PDS JSP attorneys and interns
defend children in aftercare (parole) revocation hearings.
57 Statement of the Honorable Judith Smith, D.C. Superior Court Associate
Judge (Sept. 30, 2009) (a copy of the statement is on file with the law review)

several years, faculty from the Clinic also led a session on special
education advocacy as part of the orientation training for new public
defenders. In addition, Clinic supervisors and law students provided
special education representation for a number of PDS clients
with
58
special education needs who were facing delinquency charges.
Subsequently, PDS applied for and received federal funding to hire
a full-time special education attorney. 59 As public defenders
experienced success incorporating special education advocacy into
their delinquency defense, PDS hired additional special education
attorneys in permanent, staff attorney positions. 60 The special
education attorneys worked with juvenile trial attorneys, investigators,
and social workers, providing a team approach. 6 1 This staffing pattern
continues at PDS to the present. Currently, PDS has three full-time
special education attorneys.
Judith Smith was one of the PDS attorneys who attended the 1995
special education training, and she then started the special education
program at PDS. She described the impact of special education
advocacy:
Special education attorneys in Superior Court have
had a significant impact on the judges in delinquency
court and the way delinquency attorneys practice in
D.C. When PDS special education attorneys first
started handling cases, the issues were new to the
delinquency judges. The judges were interested in the
details of the IEP, and the underlying professional
assessments, even in cases of violent offenders. PDS
attorneys
successfully
provided judges
with
alternatives to detention for juvenile offenders and, in
some cases, incarceration for young adult offenders.
Judges ordered community-based placements for
youth in cases where, without the special education
[hereinafter Statement of Judge Smith]. Judge Smith is also a former PDS JSP and
special education attorney.
51 One of the Clinic faculty members during that period was Milton C. (Tony)
Lee. Prior to joining the law school faculty, he had been a public defender at the
D.C. Public Defender Service for many years. In 1998, Tony Lee became a Superior
Court magistrate judge, and, in 2010, he became an Associate Judge. He continues to
teach doctrinal courses at UDC-DCSL as an adjunct professor.
59 Statement of Judge Smith, supra note 57.
60 Id.
61 Id.

school, they would not have considered releasing the
child back to the community. The special education
attorneys also educated the judges on school
disciplinary matters in a way most of the judges had
not heard before, and this advocacy had an impact in
probation revocation matters. 62
By 2001, PDS also began a special education law and practice
training program for attorneys practicing in D.C. Family Court. 63 "In
2003, the Superior Court established panels of attorneys eligible to
handle cases in Family Court, including a separate panel for special
education attorneys. In recent years it has become routine for judges to
appoint special education attorneys in delinquency matters." 64
Subsequently, attorneys from PDS, the Clinic, University Legal
Services (The Protection and Advocacy Center for the District of
Columbia), and others drafted practice standards for special education
panel attorneys.
In 2009, the Court adopted and implemented those
65
standards.

D. Results and Analysis of the Training and Mobilization Effort
In fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2002, the District of Columbia
Public Schools (with less than 12,000 special education students)
received 7,883 due process hearing requests. 66 During the same period
Id.
63 More recently, the Children's Law Center (CLC), a large nonprofit legal
62

services organization in D.C. that focuses primarily on representing children in
neglect matters, has also been involved in providing training in, among other topics,
special education law and practice. CLC, like PDS, has a separate unit of special
education attorneys. Judith Sandalow, the founder and executive director of CLC,
attended one of the trainings conducted by Clinic faculty in the early 1990s.
64 Statement of Judge Smith, supra note 57.
65 Id.
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Superior
Court cases to adhere to these standards.").
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DEBORAH K. NICHOLS, DIST. OF COLUMBIA AUDITOR, FLAWED PROCESSES

AND INEFFECTIVE SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY PERTAINING TO DCPS' SPECIAL
EDUCATION PROGRAM HAVE RESULTED IN COSTLY LEGAL FEES AND EXORBITANT

of time, California, a state with 670,000 special education students,
67
was projected to receive about 2,670 due process hearings requests.
By 2002, the number of due process hearings in 68D.C. was greater than
the number of hearings in the state of California.
A 2003 study highlighted the failing special education system in
the District of Columbia. 69 The percentage of due process complaints
resolved by hearing officer determinations (rather than by settlement
or by mediation) in D.C. sharply rose to fifty-nine percent of special
education disputes, in comparison to the national average of twelve
percent. Due process hearings at the time were "virtually the exclusive
mechanism" for resolving special education disputes, "notwithstanding
that this mechanism delays the delivery of services to students and is
far more time-consuming and costly than informal dispute resolution
procedures."70
In many special education cases, utilizing the so-called
"Burlington" remedy, D.C. parents won the right to place their
children in private, special education schools at public expense. In
2007, the Washington Examiner reported that,
[t]he District of Columbia's special education
department paid $160 million in sixteen months to
send some 2,000 children to outside schools. But
CHARGES FOR RELATED SERVICES AND NONPUBLIC TUITION 24 (May 9, 2003),

available at http://dcauditor.org/sites/default/files/DCA0303.pdf.
67 Id.
68 Id. See infra graph accompanying note 119.
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PIPER RUDNICK LLP, A TIME FOR ACTION: THE NEED TO REPAIR THE
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DISPUTES
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THE DISTRICT

OF

COLUMBIA
(2003),
available
at
http://www.dcappleseed.org/library/Special-Ed-Rprt.pdf
(citing Mike Rupert,
Grievances Against DCPS More Than Double, D.C. EXAMINER, Aug. 24, 2005,
available at http://www.dcappleseed.org/article/grievances-against-dcps-more-thandouble).
70 Id. at 16.
71 See School Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of
Mass., 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (placement of children by parents when FAPE is at
issue); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148 (2006) (explaining
that if the parents of a child with a disability who previously received special
education and related services under the authority of a public agency enroll the child
in a private elementary school or secondary school without the consent of or referral
by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to
reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer
finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to
the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment).

don't expect school officials to be able to give a full
account of where the money went. More than a year
after the Department of Education threatened to cut
off federal funds to the schools because of shoddy
accounting practices, the schools and the city finance
office continue to mismanage their dollars. In 2006,
the legislative budget was $82 million for the
education of the 2,000-plus children attending
72
facilities outside of the city's public school system.
The Washington Post reported that, in 2009, nearly twenty percent
of the District's special education students were enrolled in private
schools because "the city cannot meet their needs."73 A D.C. Public
School District (DCPS) watchdog, Mary Levy, emphasized that
"[1]itigation is the reason that a lot of children get services at all." 74
The large increase in the number of attorneys trained to provide
special
education
representation
self-evidently
fueled
the
75
hearings.
education
special
of
number
the
in
increase
unprecedented
Three elements, however, catalyzed the explosion of special education
advocacy.
First, the attorneys had existing attorney-client relationships with
the children or with the parents by virtue of the delinquency and
neglect cases, and the attorneys, similarly, had a continuing stream of
prospective special education clients as a result of their court
appointments to delinquency and neglect cases.
Second, the attorneys had a clear self-interest in bringing special
education cases for these delinquency and neglect clients in that
prevailing in a special education hearing entitles the litigant (i.e., the
76
parent of the child) to attorneys' fees at market rate. Thus, instead of
Bill Myers, D.C. Special Education Can't Account For Millions, WASH.
EXAMINER,
June
12,
2007,
available
at
http://washingtonexaminer.com/local/2007/06/dc-special-ed-cant-accountmillions/74098.
73 Michael Bimbaum, Special-Ed Lawyers Complain of Slowdown in D.C.
Payments,
WASH.
POST,
Jul.
16,
2009,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/15/AR2009071503711 .html.
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74 Id.

75 But see, generally, NICHOLS, supra note 66, at 20-23. A small number of

law firms accounted for 1,487 hearing requests, approximately half of the hearing
requests in fiscal year 2002. Id. at 20.
76 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)-(C) (2006); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.517(a)(1)(i),
300.517(c) (2006). In 2001, the Supreme Court ruled that receipt of attorneys' fees

handling a large caseload and exclusively billing at the exceedingly
low court-appointed rate, the attorneys could take 77
fewer cases and
make, on average, significantly more money per hour.
Third, and most importantly, Clinic faculty focused on parents and
children who, by virtue of their low socioeconomic and minority
status, were the least likely to be receiving appropriate special
education needs. In jurisdictions other than the District of Columbia,
the relatively small number of lawyers who practice special education
law are typically much more likely to be representing upper-income
parents. Parents' attorneys achieved an unprecedented rate of success
against DCPS because their clients' children were attending
chronically under-performing schools and were simply not receiving
appropriate services.
E. Some UnanticipatedEffects of the Training and Mobilizing Effort
1. The Blackman-Jones Class Action
The rapidly rising number of due process hearing requests led to a
backlog of hearings, and in a high percentage of cases, D.C. was
78
failing to provide a hearing within the statutorily defined timeframe.
Highlighting the deficiencies in D.C.'s provision of FAPE to special
education students, plaintiffs initiated two class action lawsuits
charging DCPS with violations of their constitutional rights and their
right to FAPE pursuant to the IDEA. In Blackman v. District of
Columbia, plaintiffs challenged D.C.'s failure to hold timely due
process hearings as mandated by the IDEA, and in Jones v. Districtof
as a prevailing party under a civil rights fee-shifting statute required that a court alter
the legal relationship between the parties. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v.
W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001). Thus, in
Buckhannon, the Supreme Court rejected the catalyst theory through which many
lower courts had granted attorneys' fees to civil rights claimants whose attorneys had
achieved a favorable settlement, but did not litigate to the point of a court order.
Ironically, the Buckhannon ruling arguably incentivizes plaintiffs, including special
education parents, to be more litigious and less open to settlement.
77 Attorneys appointed by Superior Court judges to provide special education
representation to parents of children in the delinquency (or child welfare system)
receive payment through the court at the same hourly rate paid for delinquency or
child welfare representation. Special education attorneys at the Public Defender
Service do not seek attorneys' fees. The Clinic faculty and students also do not seek
attorneys' fees.
78 See Blackman v. District of Columbia, 145 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2001); 34
C.F.R. § 300.510(b).

Columbia, plaintiffs sued DCPS for unduly delaying the
implementation of hearing officer determinations (HODs) and
settlement agreements (SAs). 79 On October 21, 1997, the Blackman
class was certified, and, on May 13, 1998, the Jones subclass was
certified. On June 3, 1998, having consolidated the two cases, the
Court granted summary judgment on liability in favor of the plaintiffs
and "urged the parties to seek a remedial plan to address the
shortcomings in DCPS' special education program."
The parties reached a settlement agreement in 1999; the following
year the parties entered into a revised settlement agreement, which was
followed by a supplement to the revised settlement agreement in 2000.
The parties requested mediation in 2002. The mediation resulted in a
consent decree, which was preliminarily approved by U.S. District
Court Judge Paul Friedman in 2003. After further delay, the consent
decree was finally signed on August 24, 2006.
In July of 2011, Judge Friedman released D.C. from the Blackmansegment of the suit. The Jones portion of the case, involving the
timely implementation of HODs and SAs, ended in late 2014.
2. Congressional Limits on Attorneys' Fees
The increase in legal expenditures related to special education
dispute resolution reflects the pressure created by D.C. special
education advocates against the school-to-prison pipeline. In 1999,
based upon a request from D.C. Public Schools and in response to a
steep rise in attorneys' fee awards to parents' attorneys in D.C.,
Congress imposed a $4,000 cap on attorneys' fees for special
education lawyers in D.C. in an effort to reduce legal costs. 81 The cap
continued to apply during fiscal year 2000 and 2001, but was modified
subsequently. 82 In 2009, Congress removed the cap completely.
Remarkably, during the period in which Congress imposed the fee
award cap on parents' attorneys who prevailed in D.C. special
79 Blackman, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 53.

so Bill Turque, District off the Hook on Half of Special-Ed Suit, WASH. POST,

Jul. 6, 2011.
1 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-138 (1998).
82 The District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999); The District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106-522, 114 Stat. 2457 (2000); Calloway v. District of Columbia, Civil
Action No. 99-0037 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that Congress had a rational basis for
imposing a cap on attorneys' fees in cases under the IDEA).

education hearings, Superior Court judges continued to appoint and
compensate special education panel attorneys to represent low-income
parents of children in delinquency and child welfare cases. One can
surmise that conducting the short training sessions for the Superior
Court judges had reaped benefits and that, in addition, Superior Court
judges had observed and recognized the collateral positive effects of
appointing and compensating special education attorneys for parents in
delinquency and child welfare cases. In effect, the judges tacitly
supported the case aggregation strategy by providing a means for a
significant number of the special education attorneys to endure the
congressionally imposed fee cap. 83
III.

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

In Washington,
rehabilitating youthful
providing unsuitable
custody. 84 This article

D.C., the youth agencies entrusted with
offenders have been criticized for decades for
services to the youth committed to their
will briefly trace the history of three juvenile

incarceration facilities: the Cedar Knoll Youth Center (Cedar Knoll);
the Oak Hill Youth Center (Oak Hill); and the D.C. Receiving Home
for Children (the Receiving Home).

83

In 2007, the D.C. Council enacted the Public Education Reform Act of 2007,

which essentially dismantled the elected school board and empowered the mayor to
administer the D.C. public school system. D.C. CODE § 38-171 et seq. (2001 & Supp.
2011). Mayor Adrian Fenty appointed Michelle Rhee as the first Chancellor of D.C.
Public Schools. In a series of high-profile reform efforts, Chancellor Rhee sought to
turn around the District's low-performing public schools. D.C. also experienced a
sharp increase in the number of public charter schools and the percentage of public
school students enrolled in public charter schools. Arguably, the exploding rate of
special education due process hearings and the radically rising costs of special
education services and transportation in D.C. were catalysts that helped to create the
political will to restructure the governance of the public school system. Whether
those reforms have advanced the quality of public elementary and secondary
education in D.C. is a matter of heated debate. An analysis of that topic is beyond the
scope of this article.
84 See, e.g., In re W.L., 603 A.2d 839, 846 n.4 (D.C. 1991); In the Matter of An
Inquiry into Allegations of Misconduct Against Juvenile Detained at and Committed
at Cedar Knoll Institution, Department of Human Resources, 430 A.2d 1087, 108890 (D.C. 1981).

A. Cedar Knoll
Originally designed as a 225-bed residential facility, Cedar
Knoll,
located in Laurel, Maryland, held both detained and
committed youth. The facility routinely housed far more youth than it
had capacity for, offered86substandard care or worse, and experienced a
high number of escapes.
In 1985, the unsuitable conditions of confinement, staff abuses,
and overcrowding at Cedar Knoll and the other two juvenile
incarceration facilities led to a class action lawsuit against the District.
On behalf of a class of plaintiffs detained in D.C. juvenile facilities,
the D.C. Public Defender Service and the National Prison Project of
the American Civil Liberties Union initiated the class action lawsuit
Jerry M. v. District of Columbia. Confined children "filed suit
challenging the failure of the District of Columbia and those officials
responsible for administering the juvenile facilities . . . to provide
appropriate care, rehabilitation, and87treatment under the Constitution
and the District of Columbia Code."
On July 24, 1986, the parties entered into a consent decree
approved by Judge Ricardo M. Urbina. 88 The decree squarely
addressed overcrowding in D.C.'s juvenile facilities, establishing a
framework of several guiding principles. One of those principles was
that a child who could function safely in a community-based program
should not be confined to a secure juvenile facility. In addition, the
decree provided that those children who must be confined must be in
the least restrictive environment and given appropriate services.
Recognizing the unsuitable conditions at the facility, the decree
ordered the District to close Cedar Knoll. 89
85 The names "Cedar Knoll" and Oak Hill Annex" were used interchangeably
for a time.

86 LISA FELDMAN ET AL., A TALE OF Two JURISDICTIONS: YOUTH CRIME AND

DETENTION RATES IN MARYLAND AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, BUILDING
BLOCKS
FOR
YOUTH
11
(2001),
available
at

http://www.cclp.org/documents/BBY/dcmd.pdf (citing fifteen escapes from Cedar
Knoll in a single month in 1992).
87District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 181 (D.C. 1990).
88Id.
89 Cf. generally Testimony of Judge Hamilton, supra note 21 ("I am reminded
of what happened with Cedar Knoll. It was a minimum to medium security
incarceration facility for D.C. children. Virtually everyone agreed that we didn't
need a large institution for locking up relatively young children who were not
dangerous. Yet Cedar Knoll did not close until Congress wrote in D.C.'s 1993
budget that there would be no money spent on Cedar Knoll. Then, finally, it

The District subsequently failed to comply with the terms of the
consent decree. The plaintiffs sought to compel D.C. to comply with
its agreement to reform the juvenile justice system in a manner that
also reduced the time that young people were in secure facilities. As
the city continued to drag its feet, the public became increasingly
frustrated. In 1993 Congress reacted to the furor over the District's
mishandling of its youth incarceration facilities by removing the
funding for Cedar Knoll from the D.C. Appropriations bill, assuming
90
that this action would force the District to close the troubled facility.
Instead, the District found alternate funding from its own coffers, and
was able
to keep Cedar Knoll in operation for several additional
91
years.
The continuing failure of the District of Columbia to comply with
the consent decree, coupled with the continued overcrowding of its
facilities, prompted Judge Urbina to fine D.C. $1,000 per day for every
youth held in excess of agreed-upon population caps, and, by May
1993, the fines amounted to approximately $2 million. 92 During this
time, the number of juveniles escaping from the Cedar Knoll facility
continued to grow, signaling a serious staffing problem, and public
discontent mounted. Finally, on June 1, 1993, Cedar Knoll facility
closed.93 Prior to closing, the facility was housing 200 to 300 children.
B. Oak Hill
Oak Hill was the second-largest D.C. youth detention facility
during this period, with a capacity for 188 children (but often holding
more children than the capacity). Like Cedar Knoll, Oak Hill
sometimes housed a mixture of detained and committed youth.
Located in Laurel, Maryland, and in operation since 1967, the razorwire and gated facility was nicknamed "Little Lorton" because of its
similarities to Lorton, the District of Columbia's prison for adult
closed.") With the exception of one housing unit (Wilson Cottage), Cedar Knoll was
historically a facility for youth designated as "minimum" and "medium security."
Thus, the continuing use of that facility to incarcerate low-level offenders was
inconsistent with the guiding principles of the Jerry M. decree. See Jerry M., 571
A.2d at 181.
90 FELDMAN ET AL., supra note 86, at 11.
91 Id.

92 Id. at 12 (citing Nancy Lewis, Judge's Costly Ruling: Juveniles Housed at
Closed D.C. Institution, WASH. POST, Sep. 15, 1994).
93 Symposium, Systemic Critique and Transformation, 3 D.C. L. REv. 404,
410-17 (1995).

felons. 94 As a reporter for the Washington Post observed, in "[Oak
Hill's] heyday, it had 208 beds spread across 11 buildings. From
January 1988 to January 1989, 319 youths were on runaway status, an
additional 191 didn't return from weekend passes and 128 escaped." 95
In addition to focusing on Cedar Knoll, the Jerry M. litigation
sought to remedy the deplorable conditions at Oak Hill. Specifically,
the consent order outlined a detailed process whereby the District
would both determine the number of beds needed for its detained and
committed youth populations and then allocate those beds based upon
a priority system, while simultaneously developing community-based
programs for youth who required
supervision but whose behavior did
96
not warrant incarceration.
For a period of years, the District failed to implement the required
changes at Oak Hill, and plaintiffs were forced to return to court
repeatedly to seek compliance. On several occasions, the judge found
the District to be in contempt for failing to comply with provisions of
the consent decree. 97 In 2003, citing dire conditions at Oak Hill,
plaintiffs' counsel moved to place the city's Youth Services
Administration (YSA), the agency overseeing juvenile incarceration
94 Robert E. Pierre, Oak Hill Center Emptied and Its Baggage Left Behind,
WASH. POST, May 29, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comwpdyn/content/article/2009/05/28/AR2009052803747.html?hpid=moreheadlines.
95 See id.
96 See generally Testimony of Judge Hamilton, supra note 21 ("There is,
remarkably enough, a consensus among all of the stakeholders in the District of
Columbia that Oak Hill should close. Yet, it has not happened, and one can predict
that it won't happen if we continue along the present course. We face the inertia of
government and a particularly insidious Catch 22: People believe that we can't close
Oak Hill (and move to the Missouri model) until we have adequate communitybased services and alternatives to incarceration. At the same time, we plow the very
human and financial resources into running Oak Hill that are necessary for
developing the community-based services and alternatives to incarceration. Thus, the
Jerry M. parties agree to Order B [of 1986, requiring a continuum of communitybased services], and eighteen years later the children still don't have a continuum of
community-based services.").
97 See generally Hearing for the Review of Deficiencies at the District of
Columbia's Youth Services Administration Hearing, U.S. Senate Comm. on
Appropriations, Dist. of Columbia Subcomm. (Mar. 30, 2004) (testimony of Ronald
S. Sullivan, Jr., Director of the Public Defender Service of the District of Columbia),
available at http://www.dcwatch.com/govern/dhs040330.htm [hereinafter Testimony
of Ronald Sullivan] ("In the almost 18 years since the parties entered into the
Consent Decree, the case has been assigned to three different judges. These judges,
using the Monitor's reports as a basis, have separately found the District out of
compliance with the Consent Decree on a number of occasions. Each judge has also
been forced to enter a series of enforcement and other orders.").

facilities at the time, into receivership. Plaintiffs' motion cited a
serious lack of leadership at YSA, chronic staffing shortages,
inadequate and inappropriate training of staff, continued
overcrowding, and a climate of violence in which youth were often
victimized inside the facility. 98
In August of 2000, Mayor Anthony Williams appointed an
independent task force, the Blue Ribbon Commission on Youth Safety
and Juvenile Justice Reform, to study the city's juvenile delinquency
system and to make recommendations. The D.C. Council later
implemented many of the Commission's recommendations in its own
reform legislation, the Omnibus Juvenile Justice Act of 2004. 99 The
purpose section of that statute offers a glimpse into the impetus for the
amendments: "The purpose of this subchapter is to create a juvenile
justice system capable of dealing with the problem of juvenile
delinquency, a system that will treat children as children in all phases
of their involvement, while protecting the needs of communities and
victims alike." 100 The Act also required the closure of Oak Hill within
four years of implementation of the Act-by 2009.101

The Act replaced YSA with a cabinet-level agency, the
Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS). In 2005, DYRS
began to generate long-sought changes designed to rehabilitate
youthful offenders in less restrictive environments and to use
community-based alternatives for youth who did not pose a risk to the
public safety. On May 29, 2009, Oak Hill closed. The remaining
inmates were transferred with much fanfare to a new sixty-bed facility,
the New Beginnings 102
Youth Development Center, on the same property
Maryland.
in Laurel,

98 See generally id. ("In October 2003, Judge Dixon had a hearing to determine
whether or not the District had come into compliance with the Consent Decree
provisions concerning staff training, staff supervision, and coordination between
assessment staff and treatment staff. On October 6, 2003, in anticipation of the
coming hearing, the Monitor issued a report finding that the District remained out of
compliance with respect to each of these issues. In December 2003, plaintiffs filed a
motion requesting the court appoint a transitional receiver. Judge Dixon held a
hearing on the receivership motion in February 2004.").
99 D.C. Law 15-261 (codified at D.C. CODE § 16-2301 et. seq.).
100 See id. § 102(b).
101 See id. § 1102.

102 Pierre, supra note 94.

C. The Receiving Home
The D.C. Receiving Home for Children, built in 1949, was a much
smaller facility, originally with a maximum capacity of thirty-eight
beds. The Receiving Home was supposed to be limited to preadjudicated and pre-disposition youth. Like Cedar Knoll and Oak Hill,
however, conditions at the Receiving Home were abysmal. Beginning
in 1973, D.C. Superior Court Judge Harold Green investigated the
conditions at the Receiving Home. Judge Greene reported that youth
living at the Receiving Home slept in overcrowded dormitories with
high temperatures and no ventilation, and that up to seventy children
were held at a given time-thirty-two children over its standard
capacity. 10 3 Ultimately, Judge Greene declared
that the facility was
"unsuitable to detain children anymore."' 10 4
Some of the controversy centered on the fact that the Receiving
Home regularly housed children in need of supervision (typically
children who were runaways or persistent truants) alongside a far more
serious category of youthful offenders or alleged offenders, in
violation of D.C. law. 105 As late as 1991, D.C. courts were still
pondering whether a child in need of supervision could even be sent to
the Receiving Home given its lack of appropriate mental health
services and related programs for such children. 106 In June 1995, the
UDC-DCSL Clinic conducted a symposium entitled, "The
' 10 7
Unnecessary Detention of Children in the District of Columbia."
The symposium highlighted the abuses within the system, including
the escalating numbers of youth being detained at the Receiving Home
for minor infractions and the ways in which the City was breaking the
law by housing serious offenders in the same facility as children in
need of supervision. The most significant finding was that D.C. was
illegally and unnecessarily detaining at least 2,000 children a year at
the Receiving Home for one or two nights, prior to their initial
103
104

Id.; see Symposium, supra note 93.
In re Savoy, 101 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 312, 319 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973)

(holding that the Receiving Home should close because it is not a suitable place of
detention under statutory standards).
105 See D.C. CODE § 16-2320(d) (2001) (prohibiting placement of status
offender in facility for delinquent children). See generally Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (2006) (limiting placement of status
offenders in juvenile detention facilities to no more than twenty-four hours).
106 See, e.g., In re W.L., 603 A.2d 839, 847-48 (D.C. 1991).
107 The symposium's articles, transcribed panels, and other findings are
published in 3 D.C. L. REV. (1995).

hearings. 1°8
George W.
symposium,
August of
closed.109

D.C. Superior Court Family Division Presiding Judge
Mitchell attended the symposium.
Following the
Judge Mitchell visited the Receiving Home, and, in
1995, Judge Mitchell ordered the Receiving Home

IV. DOCUMENTED SUCCESS AND THE NEED FOR STUDYING RESULTS

The District of Columbia experienced a significant increase in
special education advocacy-and specifically in due process hearing
requests and hearings-in the mid- to late-1990s and a massive
increase from the early- to mid-2000s. The increase in special
education advocacy coincided with a reduction in delinquency arrests
and adjudications and with the substantial reduction-approximately a
two-thirds reduction between 1993 and 2009-in the number of
juvenile incarceration beds. Correlation, of course, does not prove
causation.
To understand whether the increase in special education advocacy
for at-risk children and for their parents in D.C. was a factor in
decreasing juvenile adjudication and incarceration rates, one would
likely need to compare the decrease in delinquency adjudications and
incarceration in D.C. with the rates in comparable jurisdictions over
the past twenty or twenty-five years. 10 Unfortunately, the authors of
108

See Henry A. Escoto, Pre-Initial Hearing Detention: Are the Police

Department and Social Services Intake Following the Law?, 3 D.C. L. REV. 193
(1995); see also D.C. CODE §§ 16-2310, 16-2311 (read together, requiring intake
probation officer to release child prior to initial hearing, rather than hold the child
overnight or through the weekend in the Receiving Home); and Symposium on the
Unnecessary Detention of Children in the District of Columbia, Appendix B:
February-March 1995 Court Monitoring Report, 3 D.C. L. REV. 447, 453
("Probation officers recommended release in 103 of 148 cases in which children had
been detained overnight or over the weekend"). See also Courtland Milloy, Saving
Kids in Troubled Times, WASH. POST, June 25, 1995, at B1 ("According to statistics
cited at the symposium, sponsored by the D.C. School of Law, the District's juvenile
justice system unnecessarily, if not illegally, detains a minimum of 2,000 children
each year.").
109 FELDMAN ET AL.,

supra note 86, at 13.

110 D.C. had 4,713 delinquency case referrals in 1990, compared to 2,495 in
2000, a forty-seven percent decrease over the course of ten years. JEFFREY A. BUTTS,
URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., JUVENILE CRIME IN WASHINGTON, D.C. (2003),

available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/310910_JuvenileCrimeDC.pdf. The
national juvenile arrest rate peaked in 1996 and declined twenty-six percent by 2006.
MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,

JUVENILE RESIDENTIAL FACILITY CENSUS, 2002: SELECTED FINDINGS 4 (2006),

this article have not unearthed these data. Furthermore, and as
described above, over the past three decades, several unique
developments have influenced the D.C. delinquency system. These
have included the initiation in 1985 of the Jerry M. case, the 1995
symposium on unnecessary detention, and the mayor's blue ribbon
commission in the early 2000s. This article, therefore, does not and
cannot address whether the special education mobilizing and training
effort in D.C. caused or partially caused the delinquency system to
shrink.
Fundamentally, this article flows from the hypothesis that the
compliance gap between what the IDEA requires and what children
with disabilities from low-income families, particularly children of
color, receive leads to an immense achievement gap and to the massive
and discriminatory American school-to-prison pipeline. The D.C.
experiment in training and mobilizing delinquency defense and child
welfare attorneys to provide special education representation has led to
an unparalleled assertion of rights and to substantial and generally
positive changes in the special education system in D.C. This volume
of the law review contains a companion article to this article that
explores the rate and effects of special education hearings in the three
"outlier" jurisdictions of D.C., Puerto Rico, and New York City.111
That companion article further examines the unique rates of due
process hearing requests and hearings in D.C., even as compared to the
two other "outlier" jurisdictions. The principal finding, however, is
that the rate of due process hearings is remarkably low throughout the
country.
Under the IDEA, the state education agency is responsible for
ensuring that children with disabilities receive a free appropriate
public education in the least restrictive environment. 112 The IDEA
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/211080.pdf. These comparisons
are imprecise, obviously, in both timeframe and data points measured. Nevertheless,
they support the hypothesis that D.C.'s decline in delinquency cases (and presumably
in arrests) was steeper than in the country generally. Even that tentative conclusion is
insufficient to support any assertion regarding the impact of D.C.'s unique levels of
special education advocacy for children with delinquency or child welfare cases from
low-income families.
ill Joseph B. Tulman, Andrew A. Feinstein & Michele Kule-Korgood, Are
There Too Many Due Process Cases? An Examination of Jurisdictions with
Relatively High Rates of Special Education Hearings, 18 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 249
(2015).
112 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(11), 1416 (2006); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.41, 300.149-50,
300.175; 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.600-02 (2006). However, the law also creates a narrow
exception to this requirement for youth over eighteen, who are incarcerated in adult

established formal dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve
disagreements between parents and school administrators concerning
the provision of FAPE to students with disabilities. 113 A parent who
disagrees with the school personnel concerning a matter related to the
provision of FAPE114to the student (the parent's child) can file a due
process complaint.
Early IDEA dispute resolution data is difficult to locate and has not
always been reported consistently."15 A 1993 national study evaluating
due process procedures found that there was "a need to establish'1 16a
national database and a mechanism for gathering this information."
Some states compiled information about the implementation and
outcomes of such proceedings; however, no policy existed to ensure
consistency in reporting data until an amendment in the law required
states to monitor and report on the local education agencies'
compliance with IDEA. l l v The 2004 IDEA amendments implemented
the requirement that states report data on four areas of dispute
resolution: written state complaints, mediations, due process
complaints, and expedited due process complaints. 118 By the 20042005 school year, the state-to-state comparisons provided a more
accurate reflection of special education advocacy.

correction facilities who were not identified prior to sentencing. See 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(1 1)(C) (2006).
113 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2006).
114 Id.
115 EILEEN
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23

(1993),

available at:

http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/custom/portlets/recordDetails/detailmini.j sp
?nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearchSearchValue0=ED378714&ERICExtSearchSea
rchType0=no&accno=ED378714 (noting that "[a]t present, there is no policy in
place that requires the compilation of national data on the implementation and
outcomes of due process procedures, nor is there any requirement that states evaluate
their strategies for due process protections. Some states have made a start in the
direction of compiling information about their programs, but there is a need to
establish a national database and a mechanism for gathering this information").
116 Id.

117 20

"'

U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 (2006).
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 (2006); see also DICK

ZELLER, FIVE YEAR STATE AND NATIONAL SUMMARIES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

DATA ORIGINALLY PREPARED BY CADRE DECEMBER 2010 (2011), available at
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/National%20Part%20B %20Table%207 %
20Summary%20CADRE%20 1Feb2011 .pdf.

As demonstrated by the following graph, the rates of due process
mobilizing and training process far
hearings in D.C. subsequent to the 119
exceed those in other jurisdictions.
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The hearings in D.C. also demonstrated that DCPS administrators

and other personnel were not complying with the IDEA and that DCPS
lacked basic accountability systems. 120 The court-appointed monitor in
the Blackman-Jones case has concluded that the enforcement effort,
evidenced by the massive number of due process hearings, led to

119

CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, COMMON CORE OF DATA (CCD), STATE

NONFISCAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY/SECONDARY EDUCATION.
120 "Management within DCPS has failed to establish an adequate functioning

system of internal controls which ensures timely and competent performance of
duties and responsibilities under District and federal laws governing DCPS' special
education program." NICHOLS, supra note 66, at 29. "75% of all due process hearing
requests relate to DCPS management's failure to: (1) ensure the timely evaluation of
students; (2) implement an appropriate individualized education program (IEP); (3)
timely identify an appropriate school placement for students with disabilities; and (4)
timely implement settlement agreements or hearing officer decisions." Id. The
auditor also cites systemic factors, including the failure of principals and staff "to
adhere to laws, policies, procedures, and other [special education] requirements"; the
failure of "executive management and OSE [the Office of Special Education] to
develop and implement programs to serve the needs of students with disabilities";
and "ineffective monitoring of the provision of special education services." Id.

substantial improvement in the special education system in the District

of Columbia. 121
The D.C. initiative has successfully increased the access of parents
to administrative hearings with the result of improved special
education and quite possibly lowered rates of arrest, adjudication, and
incarceration. This success argues for more widespread development
and implementation of similar training and mobilizing programs in
other jurisdictions. Many children in the school-to-prison pipeline and
a substantial majority of incarcerated children have education-related
disabilities that require specialized instruction and related services.
These youth are entitled to special education services. The relative
lack of enforcement of special education rights by parents in other
jurisdictions, compared to the enforcement rates in D.C., provides a
basis for advocates in other jurisdictions to start programs for training
and mobilizing court-appointed delinquency defense attorneys and
others to use special education advocacy to advance the interests of
children who are facing delinquency charges and incarceration.
CONCLUSION

In jurisdictions around the country, advocates are working to
restrict the flow of the school-to-prison pipeline. Defense attorneys for
children facing delinquency and status offense charges should
familiarize themselves with special education law and particularly with
substantive and procedural rights related to school discipline. In
addition, defense attorneys should challenge the intake of delinquency
cases when children's behavior might be a manifestation of a disability
and school administrators have failed to identify and address potential

special education needs. 122
The Southern Poverty Law Center and Southern Disability Law
Center have confronted zero-tolerance policies and the discriminatory
push-out of students with disabilities by utilizing state-level
administrative complaints and attaining district-wide settlement
agreements with officials in a number of jurisdictions. Typically, these
agreements require school officials to employ positive behavioral
interventions and supports (PBIS) and other evidence-based

121 Report of the Blackman/Jones Monitor for the 2012-2013 School Year at 9

(Nov. 3, 2014), Blackman v. District of Columbia (Nos. 97-1629, 97-2402).
122 See generally Tulman & Weck, supra note 5; see also 20 U.S.C. §
1415(k)(6) (2006).

approaches to keeping children with disabilities in school. 123 Judges
Steven Teske and Brian Huff report success in addressing and
beginning to reverse the school-to-prison pipeline through a
collaborative approach. 124 These judges influenced stakeholders in
their jurisdictions to create and comply with a protocol for keeping
large numbers
of minor school-based incidents out of the delinquency
12 5
courts.

In D.C., as described in this article, advocates designed and
implemented a case aggregation and attorney mobilizing strategy.
Court-appointed attorneys typically represent large numbers of lowincome students in delinquency cases. Many of the children in these
attorneys' caseloads have unmet special education needs; school
administrators and other school staff push these "difficult" and
"behaviorally disordered" children out of school and into the
delinquency system. Court-appointed attorneys who represent children
from low-income families have an interest in more manageable
caseloads and, frankly, in making more money. These attorneys also
have an interest in extricating their clients from the delinquency
system, have an interest in ensuring that their clients succeed in
school, and have an interest in helping their clients ultimately integrate
into the economy.
Generally accepted public policy holds that providing appropriate
special education services for IDEA-eligible youth who are at risk of
delinquency involvement produces positive results in the form of
increased educational and vocational success and decreased rates of
delinquency involvement and incarceration. Common sense suggests
that youth with education-related disabilities are less likely to enter the
delinquency system if they receive appropriate special education and
related services. Likewise, youth who receive appropriate educational
services are more likely to integrate successfully into the community
and the economy.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is a federal law
that applies in every school district and in every public charter school
123 Lospennato, supra note 27, at 531.
124 Steven C. Teske and Brian Huff, The Paradox of Education in
America:
Integrating Systems for Children with Disabilities, 12 CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 1, 12-15

(2010),
available
at
http://www.ncjfcj .org/sites/default/files/Paradox%20of%2OEducation%20in%20Am
erica%20%281%29.pdf; see also Steven C. Teske and Brian Huff, The Court's Role
in Dismantling the School- to-Prison Pipeline, JUv. AND FAM. JUSTICE TODAY,
Winter 2011, at 14.
125

Id.

in the country. The successful effort to mobilize lawyers and to
generate special education advocacy in D.C. is based upon this federal
law. Results of the case aggregation in D.C. suggest that the lawyer
training and mobilization strategy was a significant factor in enforcing
the education rights of low-income children and reducing D.C.'s
reliance on prosecuting and incarcerating children. Advocates in
jurisdictions around the country, therefore, might consider adopting,
adapting, and implementing the lawyer mobilizing and special
education advocacy strategies described in this article.

